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ONE COUNTRY, THREE SYSTEMS?
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MACAU AFTER NG KA LING
Judith R. Krebs
Abstract: The Ng Ka Ling decision by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeals
and its reversal by the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, raise
serious concerns regarding the adequacy of judicial review and the protection of the rule
of law in the new special administrative regions under China's "One Country, Two
Systems" approach. Judicial review lies at the forefront of this controversy because it
largely delineates the contours of local autonomy and the extent to which those who
experience legal violations will have remedies. This Comment explores the roots of the
conflict in Hong Kong and examines whether those same factors are present in Macau.
After comparing the Basic Laws of Macau and Hong Kong, it concludes that the conflicts
over judicial review in Hong Kong could occur in Macau. However, because of Macau's
legal culture, particularly the inexperience of its judiciary, conflicts over judicial review
will probably not reappear in Macau.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of "One Country, Two Systems" began in 1978 as Deng
Xiaoping's slogan promoting the reunification of the People's Republic of
China ("PRC") with Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.' The 1982 PRC
Constitution gave legal expression to the concept through the creation of
special administrative regions ("SAR").2 Each special administrative region
would become part of China, yet exercise a high degree of autonomy. In
1997, Great Britain relinquished control of Hong Kong to China. On
December 20, 1999, Portugal returned control of Macau to China after 442
years of colonial rule. The Portuguese colony of Macau then became the
Macau Special Administrative Region, PRC. Attempts to obtain special
administrative region status over Taiwan have re-ignited tensions between
the PRC and Taiwan.
3
1 MING K. CHAN & DAVID J. CLARK, THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR "STABILITY
AND PROSPERITY" UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 3 (1991).
2 KUAN HSIN-CHI, THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE 55 (Peter Wesley-Smith & Albert
HY Chen eds., 1988); ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution of the People's Republic of
China] (adopted May 5, 1982, amended 1999) [hereinafter PRC CONST.] art. 31 translated in
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prccon.htm. "The state may establish special administrative regions when
necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted
by the National People's Congress in light of specific conditions." Id.
3 China, Taiwan "Shadow Boxing" To Defuse Tensions, INSIDE CHINA, Mar. 23, 2000, available in
<http://www.insidechina.com/features.php3?id= 145228>.
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Shortly before the Macau handover, Hong Kong faced the first test of
its new legal regime under the "One Country, Two Systems" approach in Ng
Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration4 ("Ng Ka Ling"). In Ng Ka Ling, the
Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress ("NPCSC")
reversed a decision by the local Hong Kong Court of Final Appeals ("Final
Appeals Court"). The Final Appeals Court had struck down an ordinance
adopted by the Hong Kong legislature because it impermissibly conflicted
with the "right of abode" guaranteed by Hong Kong's Basic Law.
5 On
request from the local Hong Kong government, the NPCSC issued its own
interpretation of the Basic Law. According to the NPCSC, the "right of
abode" in Hong Kong's Basic Law grants the right to live in Hong Kong
only to those (1) born outside of Hong Kong, and (2) to parents who are
already permanent residents of Hong Kong.6  This interpretation was
completely at odds with the Court of Appeals decision.
The Ng Ka Ling cases raise serious concerns regarding the adequacy
of judicial review in the new special administrative regions. Judicial review
lies at the forefront of this controversy because it largely delineates the
contours of local autonomy and the extent to which those who experience
violations of law will have remedies. Part II of this Comment provides
background on Macau. Part III explores the conflict between China and the
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeals. Part IV explores the roots of this
conflict and examines whether those same factors are present in Macau.
This comment concludes that it is unlikely that there will be a similar
conflict in Macau over judicial review.
II. MACAU: FROM PORTUGUESE TO CHINESE RULE
A. Background
Macau is a former Portuguese colony that spans only 19.3 square
miles and has a population of almost 450,000.8 The area consists of the
4 Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, 38 I.L.M 551 (1999) [hereinafter Ng Ka Ling].
5 Id.
6 Andreas Landwehr, The Honeymoon is Over as Macau Watches Events in Hong Kong, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE, Dec. 14, 1999, available in LEXIS, Asia/Pacific Rim News, Current.
Vasco Rocha Vieria, Macau's last governor under Portuguese rule, expressed concerns about the
events in Hong Kong shortly before Macau's handover. Id. Martin Lee, head of the Democratic Party in
Hong Kong was quoted as saying, "He is very correct (to be worried). It is absolutely logical, that if Hong
Kong loses some of the high degree of autonomy it has had, then Macau loses it, because we are the big
brother, Macau is the little brother." Id.
8 Embassy of Portugal, (visited Jan. 13, 2000)<http://www.portugalemb.org/territory.html>. For an
in depth history of Macau, see STEVE SHIPP, MACAU, CHINA: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE PORTUGUESE
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Macau Peninsula, Taipa Island, and Coloane Island.9 It is located at the
southern tip of China's Pearl River Delta and faces Hong Kong to the east.10
To its north is the Guangdong Province of Mainland China, which is
accessible by road." The ethnic population of the tiny island is mainly
Chinese, Portuguese, and Macanese.' The Macanese are people of mixed
Portuguese and Chinese descent and thus represent a culture particular to
Macau. 13
Able to speak both Portuguese and Chinese, the Macanese played an
important role in the history of Macau as its translators, civil servants and
mediators.' 4 This is because under Portugal, Macau used Portuguese as its
official language and Portuguese nationals filled the top offices of the
government. 15 However, before the handover, Chinese nationals made up
sixty-eight percent of Macau's residents and only a small percentage of the
total population could read or speak Portuguese. 16 Thus, the Macanese,
numbering only ten thousand, were an essential part of the middle level
management of the government. 17
Before the Asian financial downturn of the late 1990's, Macau's
economy was robust.' 8 Its per capita GDP quadrupled from 1982 to 1995.19
Macau's textile and garment manufacturing industries flourished under
favorable quota agreements with the European Union and North America.20
Macau also has a very large gambling establishment, leading to tourism
from around the region.21  After the financial crisis in Asia, Macau's
economy took a significant downturn, including a decline in tourism,
exports, and revenue from casino gambling.22 An enormous property glut
and rising unemployment made matters worse, and crime, already a problem
COLONY'S TRANSITION TO CHINESE RULE (1997); GEOFFREY C. GUNN, ENCOUNTERING MACAU: A
PORTUGUESE CITY-STATE ON THE PERIPHERY OF CHINA 1557-1999 (1996).
9 See Embassy of Portugal, supra note 8.
10 Id.
11Id.
12 Henry Chu, As Portugal Prepares To Hand Over The Enclave To China, Many Of The Territory's
Residents Of Chinese-Portuguese Descent-The 'Macanese'--Fear Their Distinctive Way Of Life May Be
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in the territory, began to get out of control.23 Violence broke out from
among the numerous gangs or "triads" comprising Macau's underworld.24
In the four years before the handover, gang violence left more than thirty-
five people dead and many others injured after a string of executions,
bombings, arsons and stabbings.25 Shortly before the handover, Macau
police went on a major offensive, arresting one of the more notorious triad
leaders, known as "Broken Tooth.",
26
B. Portugal Passes Sovereignty of Macau to China
While the physical handover occurred in 1999, Portugal actually
passed sovereignty over Macau to China much earlier. After the Great
Proletarian Revolution of China began in the spring of 1966, riots erupted
between Portuguese authorities and pro-Communist, pro-China forces in
Macau.27 To quiet tensions, Portugal and China signed an agreement in
1967, providing for "reasonable cooperation" and assuring Portugal that it
could continue administering Macau.
When the Portuguese Revolution of 1974 ended a half-century of
fascist rule, the opportunity for independence for all of Portugal's colonies
became real.29 Within the new socialist Portuguese regime, the pro-Moscow
faction fought with the pro-Beijing faction over the future of Macau.3 ° The
former allied with the Soviet agenda of de-colonization, and argued that
Macau should be made independent. 31 The latter contended that the territory
should be returned to China.32 The political debate within Portugal fueled
more tensions with China, since China had already asked the United Nations
("UN") to stop considering Hong Kong and Macau as colonies and instead
recognize that the territories were rightfully part of China.
33
Ultimately, the question was resolved in favor of Beijing when
Portugal's Minister of De-colonization told the UN that Portugal no longer
23 Id.




27 SHIPP, supra note 8, at 87.
21 Id. at 94.




33 SHIPP, supra note 8, at 95.
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regarded Macau as a Portuguese colony.34  Eager to rid itself of its
imperialistic past, Portugal offered Macau to China soon after.35  China
declined an immediate return, preferring instead to take formal sovereignty
over Macau while allowing Portugal to continue the difficult task of
administering the territory.
36
In 1984, the PRC and the United Kingdom signed the Joint
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, setting the stage for the Hong
Kong handover.37 The PRC adopted the Hong Kong Basic Law ("HKBL")
in 1990.38 The HKBL serves as a mini-constitution for the new special
administrative region. The parties set July 1, 1997 as the official date for
turning over sovereignty. 39 After China and the UK reached agreement on
Hong Kong in 1984, the handover of Macau became of greater importance.4 °
Beijing wanted the handover of Macau to coincide with the handover of
Hong Kong in order to "set the stage for its main objective-reunification of
Taiwan with Mainland China. ' 4l Portugal, for reasons outlined later, did not
want to rush the handover of Macau. In 1987, Beijing and Lisbon finally
reached agreement on the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration on the Question
of Macau.42 By 1993, National People's Congress ("NPC") enacted the
Basic Law of Macau.43
III. THE POST-HANDOVER CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN HONG KONG
On January 29, 1999, the Court of Final Appeals for the Special
Administrative Region of Hong Kong issued the Ng Ka Ling decision. Ng
Ka Ling was the Court's own Marbury v. Madison44 -the first decision
clarifying the Court's judicial review powers under the new Hong Kong
Id. at 96.
35 id.
36 Id. at 97.
31 See Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, available in 23 L.L.M. 1366
(1984) [hereinafter HKJD]
39 See Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xinzhengqu Jibenfa [Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China] (adopted Apr. 4, 1990)
[hereinafter HKBL], translated at http://www.info.gov.hk/basiclaw/english/f2.htm.
39 CHAN & CLARK, supra note 1, at 3.
40 Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, Settlement of the Macau Issue: Distinctive Features of Beijing's
Negotiating Behavior, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 253,261 (1988).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 253; The Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration on the Question of Macau (1987), available at
http://www.cri.com.cn/english/ncri-special/macao/ointd/index.html [hereinafter MD].
43 See Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Aomen Tebie Xin Zhengqu Jibenfa [Basic Law of the Macao
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated Mar. 31, 1993)
[hereinafter MBL], translated at http://www.macau.gov.mo/basiclaw/e_basiclaw.html.
44 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Basic Law. In Ng Ka Ling, a local Hong Kong immigration statute was
challenged as conflicting with the guaranteed right of abode in the Basic
Law.45 Article 24 of the Basic Law guarantees all permanent residents of
Hong Kong the right of abode.46 However, ambiguous drafting made it
unclear whether a child would automatically acquire permanent residency
when his or her parent obtained residency after the handover.47 Granting
residency to children whose parents became residents after the handover
would have allowed the influx of anywhere between 562,000 and 1.6 million
Mainland Chinese into Hong Kong.48 These estimates worried government
officials in Hong Kong and China.49
The Hong Kong ordinance sought to limit immigration by providing
that any child asserting the right of abode must be born in wedlock.50 This
meant that children could not claim the right of abode based on a father's
residency unless he was married to the child's mother. It also said that any
person who had not obtained permanent residency as of July 1, 1997 (the
date of the handover) must obtain a valid travel document and an attached
certificate of entitlement. 51 The Hong Kong Immigration Department then
published a procedural mechanism, under Basic Law Article 22(4),52 for
obtaining these documents. The procedure required that applications be
made through the entry-exit administration of the Public Security Bureau in
Mainland China.53 However, under Chinese law, applications from those
seeking permanent residency in Hong Kong or Macau are subject to
examination and approval under a quota system utilized by China.
54
Purportedly, this was to safeguard and maintain the economic prosperity of
the special administrative regions.55 Since none of the four applicants for
residency in Ng Ka Ling had received permits from China, they were refused
residency.56
45 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 4.
46 See Table 1.
47 Id.
48 According to a Hong Kong government survey 1.6 million Mainlanders would have been eligible
for the right to abode. A Human Rights Monitor survey estimated only 562,000 would have the right to
abode. S. CHINA MORNING POST, The Case and Why it Matters (Oct. 23, 1999) available in
http://www.scmp.comSpecial?.../ Fulltextasp ArticlelD- 199910231147113704.asp.
49 Id. The Hong Kong government claimed that such an influx could cost $710 billion over 10 years
in housing and services.
50 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 4, at 556.
51 id.
52 Lin Feng, The Constitutional Crisis in Hong Kong-ls it Over?, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 281,
284 (2000); see Table 1.
53 id.
54 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 4, at 558.
55 Feng, supra note 52, at 284.
56 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 4, at 560.
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Under Article 158 of the Basic Law, if the subject matter before any
of the Hong Kong courts pertains to the domestic affairs of Hong Kong, then
the local court has final adjudication.57 However, if the subject matter
pertains to the affairs of the Central Government or the relationship between
Hong Kong and the Central Government, then the Final Appeals Court must
seek an interpretation of the law from the NPCSC. 58 In striking down the
Hong Kong ordinance, the Final Appeals Court resolved the tensions
between the power of Mainland China to control emigration in Article 22(4)
and the right to abode promised in Article 24(3) by holding that under
Article 24(3), the right of abode includes the right to enter the region. 59 It
also held that permanent residents of Hong Kong are not covered by the
requirements of Article 22(4).60 By adopting this interpretation, the Court
obviated any need to examine the issue as one implicating the relationship
between Hong Kong and the Mainland. In other words, by focusing on the
right to immigrate to Hong Kong instead of China's ability to control its
own emigration, the issue no longer fell into an area governed by China.
Thus, it was not a matter requiring interpretation by the NPCSC under Basic
Law Article 158.
The Court of Final Appeal held that under Article 158, it has the
power to strike down local legislation that conflicts with rights guaranteed
by the Basic Law.61 More controversially, it went further and said, in dicta,
that it may "examine" acts by the National People's Congress or its Standing
Committee to determine whether they conform to the Basic Law and declare
"invalid" those acts that do not conform. 62  The Court of Final Appeal
reasoned that the NPC is the "highest organ" of the state. Therefore, its acts
are sovereign. The NPC exercised this sovereign power when it created the
Hong Kong Region and its Basic Law using its powers under Article 31 of
57 See Table 2, attached.
58 Id.
59 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 4, at 568.
60 Id. at 569.
61 Id. at 562. According to the Court of Final Appeals, "in exercising their judicial power conferred
by the Basic Law, the courts of the Region have a duty to enforce and interpret that Law. They
undoubtedly have the jurisdiction to examine whether legislation enacted by the legislature of the Region or
acts of the executive authorities of the Region are consistent with the Basic Law, and if found to be
inconsistent, to hold them to be invalid." Id.
62 Id. "What has been controversial is the jurisdiction of the courts of the Region to examine
whether any legislative acts of the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee... are consistent
with the Basic Law and to declare them to be invalid if found to be inconsistent. In our view, the courts of
the Region do have this jurisdiction and indeed the duty to declare them to be invalid if found to be
inconsistent." Id.
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the PRC Constitution.63 Thus, the HKCFA's power of judicial review
derives from this sovereign act.
64
The decision was widely praised for its firm defense of human rights
and the rule of law. 65  However, Mainland officials and Chinese legal
scholars attacked the judgment of the HKCFA, arguing that it was putting
itself above the NPC and called for the HKCFA's decision to be rectified.
66
The Hong Kong SAR government moved for a clarification of the decision
and the motion was granted. On February 26, 1999, the HKCFA restated its
earlier position and reiterated that it was merely upholding the Basic Law as
an act of the NPC that takes precedence over subsequent acts of the NPC.67
The Hong Kong SAR responded by asking the NPCSC to interpret the
relevant provisions of the Basic Law.68 Hong Kong SAR's decision to ask
the NPCSC to override a local court decision rather than to request an
amendment to the Basic Law fueled concerns about judicial independence
and the rule of law in Hong Kong.69 In the end, the NPCSC issued an
interpretation of the right of abode different from that given by the Court of
Final Appeal, effectively overruling the local court.70 Under the NPCSC's
interpretation, only Chinese Mainlanders born after their parents had already
become permanent residents of Hong Kong could obtain the right to abode
in Hong Kong.71 The NPCSC offered limited legal reasoning, saying only
that this interpretation reflected original legislative intent.72 In addition, the
Standing Committee said that the Court of Final Appeal should have sought
an interpretation of the Basic Law from the NPCSC before adjudicating the
case because it involved an issue related to the affairs of the Central
Government.73
63 PRC CONST., supra note 2.
Ng Ka Ling, supra note 4, at 562.
65 Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism Under Chinese Rule: Hong Kong After the Handover, 27
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 292 (1999).
6 id.
67 Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, Court of Final Appeal, Final Appeal No. 14 of 1998 (Feb.
26, 1999) available in < http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/guide2cs/html/cfa/judmt/facv 14_16_98a.htm.>.
68 Davis, supra note 65.
69 Id.
70 Mark Lander, After 2 Years, Hong Kong Looks More Like China, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1999,
available in LEXIS, New Library, Current News File.
71 Landwehr, supra note 6.
72 Feng, supra note 52, at 288.
73 Id.
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IV. THE BASIS FOR THE LEGAL CONFLICT IN HONG KONG AND THE
LIKELIHOOD FOR CONFLICT IN MACAU
There are numerous reasons for the conflict between China and the
Hong Kong Court. This section identifies the following factors as causing
the constitutional crisis: (1) the ambiguity of the Hong Kong Basic Law text,
(2) the conflict between the common law and the civil law traditions
regarding the role of the courts in law making, (3) the different experiences
China and Hong Kong have had with judicial review, and (4) the differing
levels of independence exercised by judges in China and Hong Kong. The
question is whether these same factors are present in Macau.74
A. The Ambiguity of the Text
1. The Hong Kong Joint Declaration and Basic Law
7 5
Uncertainty about the adequacy of judicial remedies in Hong Kong
exists, in part, because of the ambiguity of the text. On the one hand, Hong
Kong's Basic Law promises to preserve the current legal structure, including
the continued application of past laws.76 On the other hand, it says that prior
laws must be consistent with the Basic Law, and that the Basic Law is
subject to legislative changes. 77  What, if any, prior laws are inconsistent
with the Basic Law has yet to be determined. Therefore, the level of
74 According to TIME MAGAZINE:
Macau's past and its politics couldn't be more dissimilar to those of Hong Kong. In their final
decade of colonial control, the British started democratic reforms, which were embraced by
Hong Kong's populace (and later diluted by the new pro-Beijing regime). Britain's colony was
well run, largely uncorrupt and robustly prosperous (though it suffered from the Asian financial
crisis that began the day after the handover). The big question was whether Hong Kong's
freedoms-including an independent judiciary and a free press--could survive and whether the
economy would wither without them. Macau, in contrast, goes into its transition with a self-
censoring press, an antiquated judiciary in need of an overhaul and a partly elected assembly that
has virtually shared sovereignty with China for two decades . . . Democracy was never
encouraged and corruption is rife, especially in the police and civil service. Also, thanks to the
triad wars, the economy is faltering and unemployment recently reached a high of 6%. So in
Macau, unlike Hong Kong of two years ago, the change of sovereignty elicits less dread than
hope: that China will restore peace and lure high-rollers back to the all-important gaming tables.
Anthony Spaeth, Macau's Big Gamble: The Portuguese Colony's Return to China will be a Low-Key
Affair. The Real Fireworks will Begin when the New Owners Try to Clean Up the Joint, TIME MAG., Dec.
20, 1999, available in 1999 WL 29489427.
75 Much of Hong Kong's Basic Law reiterates what was generally agreed to in the Joint Declaration
with language that is more specific. Therefore, this Comment focuses on Hong Kong's Basic Law.
76 HKBL, supra note 38, art. 8.
77 id.
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continuity in the legal systems of the new Hong Kong SAR remains
uncertain.
These same tensions exist in other areas of Hong Kong's Basic Law.
On the one hand, there is the promise of a high degree of autonomy for the
SAR, including an independent judiciary and the power of final
adjudication.78 On the other hand, it is clear that Hong Kong is directly
unddr the authority of the Central People's Government of the PRC.
79
Importantly, the NPCSC has the authority to interpret the Basic Law in
matters that are the responsibility of the PRC government or concern the
relationship between the PRC and the Hong Kong governments.
80
Thus, which body has final adjudication depends on the legal issue
under consideration. Ostensibly, the NPCSC has the power to interpret only
those legal questions related to its powers under the Basic Law, notably
foreign and defense affairs, and those issues that concern the relationship
between Hong Kong and China. 8' Since the Basic Law does not clearly
define this line, the contours of the pledge of final adjudication are far from
clear. Finally, it is unclear whether the NPCSC or the Court of Final Appeal
decides where this line should be drawn. This lack of clarity was the
primary cause of the Ng Ka Ling constitutional crisis. The Court of Final
Appeal believed that only domestic issues were implicated in the case, while
the NPCSC thought that the question was one that pertained to the
relationship between China and Hong Kong. Moreover, each institution
believed that it alone had the power to determine which institution would
have jurisdiction.
2. The Macau Joint Declaration
While the Macau Joint Declaration ("MJD") closely resembles the
Hong Kong Joint Declaration ("HKJD"), two major disputes dominated the
talks between China and Portugal and resulted in some changes to the
MJD.82 These disputes centered on the timing of the handover and the future
83nationality of Macau citizens. First, Portugal did not want to handover the
territory's administration without "careful planning.",84 More specifically,
78 Id. art. 2.
I d. art. 12.
so Id. art. 158.
SI Id. art. 18.
82 These differences are also reflected in the Macau Basic Law since it also incorporates the Macau
Joint Declaration into much of its test.
83 Chang, supra note 40, at 263.
" Id. at 259.
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Portugal did not want to replicate its abysmal failure at de-colonization in,
for instance, East Timor.85 In addition, Portugal was worried that turning
Macau over in 1997 would not allow enough time for the development of
local citizens to run the civil service bureaucracy. 86  Finally, Portugal
thought that Macau would benefit economically if it were transferred after
Hong Kong. This is because Portugal thought that changes in Hong Kong
might cause worried businessmen to "transfer capital and investments from
Hong Kong to Macau." 87 Ultimately, China adjusted its demands, asking for
the handover before the year 2000.
88
Second, there was a conflict over the nationality laws that would
apply to the new territory. Portugal allows for dual citizenship, which would
make everyone with a passport a Portuguese citizen.89 Since China does not
recognize dual national citizenship, Portugal's rules caused friction over
which nationality law would win out.90 Portugal held firm, believing that
any changes to its passport rule would raise suspicions among residents of
its other former colonies that they too would lose their right to live in
Portugal. 91 Ultimately, China agreed to grant anyone holding a Portuguese
passport before the handover dual citizenship.92
The MJD, like the HKJD, maintains that the SAR "shall be directly
under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China."93  However, Macau (like Hong Kong) is promised a
high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs. 94 In
addition, similar to the HKJD, the MJD maintains that the "current social
and economic systems in Macau will remain unchanged, and so will the
" Id. at 259-60. After Portugal left East Timor in 1975, Indonesia invaded the territory. Thus
"began an occupation marked by brutality and terror and accompanied by a systematic degradation of East
Timorese cultural life." Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination at the
International Court Of Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 323, 324 (1994). Leaders in the
independence movement in East Timor have sought to establish close ties with the Macau Special
Administrative Region based on their similar history under Portugal. Harald Bruning, East Timor Desires
Allegiance in Shared Heritage, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 19, 2000, available in 2000 WL 24577676.
6 Chang, supra note 40, at 260-61.
87 Id. at 261.
88 Id. at 259.
89 Id. at 263.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 265.
92 Id. at 267.
93 MJD, supra note 42, Annex 1, art. I, para. 4; see HKJD, supra note 37, art. 3, para. 2. "The Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the Central People's
Government of the People's Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy
a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs which are the responsibilities of the
Central People's Government."
94 MJD, supra note 42, arts. 12-14; see HKJD, supra note 37, at 12-14.
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lifestyle" 95 for 50 years.96 Again, similar to the HKJD, the MJD also
promises "the laws currently in force in Macau will remain basically
unchanged.97  Moreover, Portugal assured the UN Human Rights
Committee that under the Macau Joint Declaration, the Intemational
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would continue to apply after the
administration of the territory passed to China.98 This was later expressly
confirmed in the Macau Basic Law.
99
To guarantee these rights, the MJD (similar to the HKJD) promises,
"judicial power shall be vested in the courts of the Macau Special
Administrative Region."' 00 Moreover, the "power of final adjudication shall
be exercised by the Court of Final Appeal . :. independently and free from
any interference, and shall be subordinated only to the law."'' 1 In addition,
both declarations vest power in the legislatures of the Special Administrative
Regions. However, the MJD, unlike the HKJD, does not guarantee that all
members of Macau's legislature will be elected. 10 2 In Macau, the legislature
"shall be composed of local inhabitants, and the majority of its members
shall be elected."' 0 3 In contrast, the HKJD promises that "[t]he legislature..
shall be constituted by elections."'
104
3. The Macau Basic Law
Although two different committees purportedly drafted the Hong
Kong and Macau Basic Laws, the language of the laws is remarkably
similar.'05 The question is whether the provisions at stake in the Ng Ka Ling
case are significantly different from those in Macau's Basic Law. They are
95 MJD, supra note 42, art. 2, para. 4; see HKJD, supra note 37, art. 3, para. 5 ("The current social
and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style.").
96 MJD, supra note 42, at annex I, art. 1, para. 3; see HKJD, supra note 37, annex I, art.l, para 3.
97 MJD, supra note 42, art. 2, para. 4.
98 Press Release, United Nations, Human Rights Committee Begins Consideration of Portugal's
Report on Territory of Macau (Apr. 4, 1997), U.N. Doe. HR/CT/489.
99 See MBL, supra note 43, art. 40 ("The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour
conventions as applied to Macau shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the
Macau Special Administrative Region.").
1oo Id., annex 1, art. IV, para. 1.
101 Id.
102 SHIPP, supra note 8, at 109; MJD, supra note 42, annex I, art. IlI; HKJD, supra note 37, annex I,
art. II.
:03 MJD, supra note 42, annex I, art. III (emphasis added).
04 HK.ID, supra note 37, annex I, art. 1.
105 SHIPP, supra note 8, at 110. For an in-depth discussion of the negotiations over the Hong Kong
Basic Law, see Chang, supra note 40. See also Table 2, attached.
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not. 106 For instance, both Basic Laws promise a high degree of autonomy,
including judicial independence and the right of final adjudication. 1 7 Both
carry laws previously in force into effect after the handover. 0 8 Together,
they also place ultimate interpretation of the Basic Law in the hands of the
NPCSC.' 0 9 Finally, both Basic Laws require the Courts of Final Appeals to
seek an interpretation from the Standing Committee on issues related to
foreign or defense affairs or the relationship between the SARs and
Mainland China."
0
However, an important difference in the texts is that the Macau Basic
Law expressly subordinates judicial decisions of the Court of Final Appeals
to the NPCSC."' By contrast, Hong Kong's Basic Law does not expressly
do so. 112 The presence of this express provision in Macau's Basic Law
further weakens the case for greater judicial review in Macau. Another
difference in the text reflects Hong Kong's common law versus Macau's
civil law tradition. The Hong Kong Basic Law includes an express
provision carrying over the judicial system that was "previously practised"
in the territory, while Macau's judicial system is to be "prescribed by
law." ' 13 In the common law tradition, present practice is informed by past
practice.1 14 In the civil law tradition, without stare decisis, legal process is
generally dictated by statute.' 15
This second difference between common law and civil law is why
Portugal raised concerns two months before the handover over inadequate
preparation by China for the new judicial system of Macau.1 6 Vasco Rocha
Vieira, Macau's last Portuguese Governor, said that China was unwilling to
cooperate in localizing the territory's judicial system before the handover.1
7
He said that China had "reserved for itself' the decision to set up Macau's
Court of Final Appeals and implement the new judicial system of the
106 See Table 2, attached.
'o7 HKBL, supra note 38, arts. 2, 12; MBL supra note 43, arts. 2, 12.
'08 HKBL, supra note 38, arts. 8, 14; MBL supra note 43, arts. 8, 14.
09 HKBL, supra note 38, arts. 12, 13; MBL supra note 43, arts. 12, 13.
I0 HKBL, supra note 38, arts. 159, 144; MBL supra note 43, arts. 159, 144.
Compare HKBL, supra note 38, art. 84 with MBL supra note 43, art. 89.
12 See HKBL, supra note 38, art. 84.
"3 HKBL, supra note 38, art. 81; MBL supra note 43, art. 84.
114 Black's Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as "[t]o abide by or adhere to, decided cases."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (6th ed. 1991).
" JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 22 (1985).
116 Harald Bruning, Governor Regrets China's Inaction Over Macau Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 30, 1999, available in LEXIS, News group file.
117 Id.
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territory after the handover."18 This not only gave total control to China in
setting up the judiciary; it also led to a very inexperienced judiciary.
1 9
Finally, the "right of abode" provision in the Macau Basic Law is
different from the Hong Kong Basic Law. Drafters of Macau's Basic Law
sidestepped this explosive issue by clearly restricting the right of abode to
Macau. In Macau, only a child born after his or her parent became a
permanent resident of Macau is capable of being a permanent resident of the
region.120 Thus, the NPCSC interpretation of the Hong Kong Law in the Ng
Ka Ling case is already the law in Macau.
l2 1
4. Conclusion
Comparing the texts of the Hong Kong Joint Declaration and Basic
Law with Macau's versions, reveals that while the language is remarkably
similar, the differences are significant enough to prevent the kind of
constitutional crisis that occurred in Hong Kong. First, Article 89 of
Macau's Basic Law expressly requires that when a question regarding
foreign or defense affairs arises in a court, the judge must obtain certification
from Macau's Chief Executive on questions of fact concerning acts of
state. 122 This certificate is binding on the court. 123 Moreover, before the
Chief Executive issues the certificate, he or she must obtain a certifying
document from the PRC government. Second, there will be less confusion
in Macau because unlike Hong Kong, the courts are not applying law
"previously practiced."'' 24 Instead, in the civil law tradition, all legal norms
are spelled out in positive law. Third, the Macau right of abode provision
was drafted clearly and narrowly in order to avoid the problem of mass
migration into the region. Thus, this lack of ambiguity lessens the need to
define the norm through a legal process.
i11 Id.
119 For a comparison of the judicial cultures ofHong Kong and Macau, see infra Part IV.D.
120 See Table 1.
12 1 Harald Bruning, Macau Escapes Abode Muddle, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 24, 2000,
available in LEXIS, News group file.
:22 MBL supra note 43, arts. 19, 89.
123 MBL supra note 43, art. 19.
124 HKBLsupra note 38, art. 81.
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B. Common Law Versus Civil Law Tradition
1. Hong Kong Common Law and Chinese Civil Law
Another root of the constitutional crisis in Ng Ka Ling was the clash
between Hong Kong's common law tradition acquired under British rule and
the Chinese experience with the civil law tradition. 125  Specifically, the
conflict revolves around whether the courts can or cannot make law. China
follows the civil law tradition in which the legislature makes law and the
courts may only enforce the law.' 26 Hong Kong, on the other hand, follows
the common law tradition where both legislatures and courts may make law.
Interestingly, the civil law tradition of prohibiting courts from making
law grows out of the French Revolution and the unique perspective it
inspired regarding the notion of separation of governmental powers.
127
Under Western separation of power theory, in order to protect individual
liberty it is necessary to divide governmental power between the three
branches of government-the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.
128
However, the Chinese regard Western separation of power doctrine as a
bourgeois concept. 129 Instead, the reasoning underlying interpretation by the
legislative branch in China is actually the lack of competition between the
125 Guiguo Wang & Priscilla M.F. Leung, One Country, Two Systems: Theory Into Practice, 7 PAC.
Rim L. & POL'Y J. 279, 300 (1998).
126 Id.
127 This is because, according to John Henry Merryman:
In France the judicial aristocracy were targets of the revolution not only because of their
tendency to identify with the landed aristocracy but also because of their failure to distinguish
very clearly between applying law and making law. As a result of these failings ... progressive
legislative reforms had frequently been frustrated. The courts refused to apply the new laws,
interpreted them contrary to their intent, or hindered the attempts of officials to administer them.
MERRYMAN, supra note 115, at 16.
According to Merryman, the Western common law tradition regards law making in the courts very
differently:
In the United States and England... here was a different kind ofjudicial tradition, one in which
judges had often been a progressive force on the side of the individual against the abuse of
power by the ruler... [T]he power ofjudges to shape the development of the common law was
a familiar and welcome institution.
Id.
128 ALLAN BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 15 (1989). This idea is well
represented by James Madison in The Federalist Papers. According to Madison: "The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
129 PETER WESLEY-SMITH, I CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 31-32
(1987).
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branches of government.' 30 Since all governmental institutions are working
for the good of the people, and the NPC is the people's institution, then it is
appropriate for it to provide interpretation of its laws for the courts.'
31
Carefully distinguishing between making law and enforcing it reveals
why China can say that the SAR has final adjudication but in reality it
reserves final interpretation for itself 132 Final adjudication under Chinese
judicial review amounts to final enforcement of the legal interpretation
provided by the NPC. Thus, at the heart of the right of abode controversy is
a fundamental conflict between civil law and common law notions of the
judicial role in law making.'
33
2. Portuguese Civil Law
Portugal is a civil law country,' 34 and like China, its courts do not
make law. However, while Portugal follows the civil law tradition, it has
strong constitutional review in its courts. 135 Therefore, it does not share the
same separation of powers concerns of many civil law countries regarding




Looking at Portugal's civil law tradition, Macau could theoretically run
into a Ng Ka Ling type conflict with China. This is because Portugal has
such strong constitutional review of legislative acts. However, since the
Macau Basic Law limits the courts to those legal norms that have been
expressly carried forward through the enactment of local law, the Portuguese
legal tradition is somewhat inconsequential to the future of Macau.
130 Id.
131 Id.
32 See, e.g., MBL, supra note 43, art. 2.
'3 See infra Part IV.C.2.
134 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA AND EAST
ASIA341 (1994).
' ' See infra Part IV.C.3.
3'6 For example, the Constitutional Court rejected a proposed nationwide referendum question on
European Union participation because it lacked the objectivity, clarity and precision" required by law. The
referendum question was ultimately dropped. Peter Wise, Portugal drops EMU vote proposal, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 31, 1998, available in LEXIS, News group file.
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C. Judicial Review in Hong Kong and China
There is a significant difference between the common law process of
making law in the courts and judicial review. Judicial review refers to the
ability of courts to review the constitutionality of legislative acts. 137 It is
possible to have courts make law without constitutional review (e.g., Great
Britain) or constitutional review without courts making law (e.g., France).
1. Judicial Review in Hong Kong under the UK
Great Britain has an unwritten and abstract constitution, and the courts
may not review acts of Parliament. 38 The absence of a constitution and
judicial review derives from Britain's system of parliamentary supremacy. 39
Thus, according to one scholar, "most British judges and the vast majority of
British lawyers must have had little or no contact with the problems and
workings ofjudicial review." In British Railways Board v. Pickin, 141 Lord
Wilberforce described how judicial review is viewed in the British system:
The idea that an Act of Parliament, public or private or a
provision in an Act of Parliament, could be declared invalid or
ineffective in the courts on account of some irregularity in
Parliamentary procedure, or on the ground that Parliament in
passing it was mislead, or that it was obtained by deception or
fraud, has been repudiated by authorities of the highest standing
since 1842 onwards. The remedy for a Parliamentary wrong, if
one has been committed, must be sought from Parliament, and
cannot be gained from the courts. 1
42
The British system of legislative supremacy might lead one to believe
that Hong Kong's pre-handover constitution could be reconciled with
China's Constitution. However, unlike the UK, judicial practice in Hong
Kong permitted constitutional review of legislative acts. 4 3  The UK
followed this custom with all of its colonies, including India and Canada. 144




141 British Railways Board v. Pickin, [1974] A.C. 765 (Eng.).
42 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 128, at 2.
143 WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 129, at 56.
144 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 128, at 181.
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In pre-handover Hong Kong, the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions
served as the written basis of rights, duties, and power in Hong Kong's
colonial government. 45 These colonial regulations constituted the supreme
law of Hong Kong and were referred to as "constitutional documents" since
no Hong Kong laws could contravene them.146 Therefore, in the hierarchy
of legal norms, these constitutional documents trumped local legislation.
Hong Kong's judicial system before the handover consisted of
magistrate courts, district courts, and the Supreme Court 
of Judicature.147
However, judicial decisions made in the Hong Kong courts were not final.
Instead, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London was the final
appeals pourt for Hong Kong.' 48 While the Privy Council was not strictly a
judicial body, and it did not always separate legal questions from policy
questions, it was a court staffed by professional judges. 149 Moreover,
because of British rule, Hong Kong's legal system is based on the doctrine
of case precedent or stare decisis.15
2. Judicial Review in China
China has a written Constitution. The 1999 Constitution declares that
it is the "fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority."''
145 WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 129.
146 Id. at 81.
147 Jin Huang & Andrew Xuefeng Qian, "One Country, Two Systems, " Three Law Families, and
Four Legal Regions: The Emerging Inter-Regional Conflict of Law in China, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
289, 299 (1998).
148 Id.
149 WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 129, at 199. On average about 25 cases went to the Privy Council
from Hong Kong each year. Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
Ordinance, 35 I.L.M. 207, 208 (1996).
150 Daniel R. Fung, Foundation for the Survival of the Rule of Law in Hong Kong-The Resumption
of Chinese Sovereignty, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 283, 285-86 (1997).
'51 PRC CONST., supra note 2. According to the Preamble: "This Constitution, in legal form, affirms
the achievements of the struggles of the Chinese people of all nationalities and defines the basic system and
basic tasks of the state; it is the fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority." According
to Article 5:
The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system.
No laws or administrative or local rules and regulations may contravene the Constitution.
All state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all
enterprises and institutions must abide by the Constitution and the law. All acts in violation of
the Constitution and the law must be investigated.
No organization or individual is privileged to be beyond the Constitution or the law.
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Thus, the PRC Constitution enjoys precedence over all other legal norms.
152
Additionally, the NPC is the "highest organ of state power and its permanent
body is the Standing Committee."' 53 The NPC, with 3,500 members, meets
infrequently. 54 Therefore, the Standing Committee (200 members) plays an
important legislative function.' 5  The NPC "has the right and obligation to
make and revise constitutions and 'basic laws'."' 56 According to Chinese
jurists, generally, "basic laws" are anything enacted by the NPC.'57 The
Standing Committee may pass laws other than basic laws or may amend
basic laws enacted by the NPC.'58
China's Supreme People's Court ("SPC") is the "highest judicial
organ," and "supervises the administration of justice by the people's courts at
various local levels."' 159 While the SPC is the highest judicial body, it is
nonetheless "responsible to the National People's Congress and its Standing
Committee."'' 60  Therefore, the NPC has supremacy over the SPC.
According to one scholar:
The relationship between the Court and the NPC and its
Standing Committee is based on the theory of yixing heyi-the
combination of legislation and administration, which was first
proposed by Karl Marx in the Paris Commune. According to
Marx, the Paris Commune, as the highest authority, was to
perform both legislative and judicial functions.161
Thus, the NPC has the power to appoint or remove the President of
the Court. 162 The Standing Committee may remove the "Vice Presidents and
Judges of the Supreme People's Court, members of its Judicial Committee
and the President of the Military Court."' 163 The NPCSC may supervise the
..2 YONG ZHANG, COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON THE JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEM IN EAST AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA 108 (1997).
153 See PRC CONST., supra note 2, art. 57; TAO-TAI HSIA & CONSTANCE AXINN JOHNSON, LAW
MAKING IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: TERMS, PROCEDURES, HIERARCHY, AND INTERPRETATION 2
(1986). [hereinafter TAO-TAI HSIA].
154 TAO-TAI HSIA, supra note 153, at 4.




159 See PRC CONST., supra note 2, art. 127.
'60 Id., art. 128.
"6' NANPING LIU, OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN CHINA
29(1997).
162 See PRC CONST., supra note 2, art. 63(4); NANPING LIU, supra note 161, at 30.
163 NANPING LIU, supra note 161, at 30; see PRC Const., supra note 2, art. 67(11).
DECEMBER 2000
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Court's operations. 164  Moreover, the Court's power is limited in its
interpretation of laws. 165 Only the NPC and its Standing Committee may
interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement. 66 The Standing
Committee may also offer interpretation of law that essentially makes new
law. 167 This is known as "legislative interpretation."'' 68 "In contrast, the
Court's interpretive function is limited to clarifying and strengthening the
laws without changing their original meaning."'' 69 The Court's interpretation
is referred to as "judicial interpretation."' 170 However, the SPC often
oversteps its constitutional limitations and encroaches on legislative
power. 171 According to Dr. Nanping Liu:
In reality, however, the NPC has not performed its function of
supervising the enforcement of the Constitution, and its
Standing Committee has not undertaken to construing either
laws, with few exceptions, or the Constitution, with no
exception. Consequently, the Court has almost exclusive power
to construe laws, which has made the distinction between
legislative and judicial interpretation meaningless. And the
Court. .. may construe any laws if necessary, including the
Constitution.17f
Liu's theory is that the SPC is an "aggressive handmaiden" to the
policy of the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP"). 173  By ignoring its
constitutional limitations, the Court may deal with urgent issues in line with
CCP policy and thus will overstep its jurisdictional boundaries when it
serves a political interest.' 74 One example he cites relates to Court activities
after Tiananmen Square. In an SPC-issued document dated June 20, 1989,
the Court asked the lower courts to study the speech of Deng Xiaoping
regarding the imposition of martial law in Beijing. 175  The "document
instructed the lower courts to shift their focus to trying those counter-
'64 NANPING Liu, supra note 161, at 30; see PRC Const., supra note 2, art. 67(6).
165 NANPING Liu, supra note 161, at 30.
166 See PRC CONST., supra note 2, arts. 62(1)(2), 67(l).
167 Id., art. 67(4).
168 NANPING Liu, supra note 161, at 30.
169 Id.
170 id.
'"' Id. at 73.
172 Id. at 30-31.
171 Id. at 5.
174 Id. at 61-62.
17 Id. at 62.
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revolutionaries and criminals involved in this political turmoil.' 176  The
Court also directed that the lower courts should adjudicate the cases quickly
and the punishments should be severe. 177 Clearly, the Court was functioning
as a political body.
178
In addition, while the Chinese Constitution guarantees numerous
rights, 179 there is a fundamentally different view from liberal democracies
over the way individual rights are enforced. According to Hong Kong
scholar Michael C. Davis, "from a constitutionalism perspective, the most
definitive characteristic of recent constitutions of the People's Republic of
China ... is the collectivist rights orientation that renders rights subject to
the interest of the state."''80 In his view, someone critical of the government
who claims an individual right to speech "will be confronted with the claim
that, under the constitution, his voice contradicts the collective interest and
the state and that no such right therefore exist[s].'' The lack of real
judicial review further compounds the problem because it becomes
impossible to weigh the interests of the state against individual rights in
individual cases. 18 According to Chinese scholar Kuan Hsin-Chi:
To a Western lawyer, constitutional practice means the
activities by which constitutional norms are elucidated and
upheld, especially against the politically powerful.
Constitutional review by the courts then occupies a central
place in the process. For the Chinese leadership, however,
constitutional practice means the implementation of Party
policy.1
83
3. Judicial Review in Macau under Portugal
Since the Macau Joint Declaration and Basic Law provide that the
pre-handover legal structure will be preserved, including the continued
application of past laws,184 it is necessary to review the structure of the
176 Id. at 62 (emphasis in original).
77 Id.
17s Id. at 63.
1 See PRC CONST., supra note 2, arts. 33-50.
'go Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate Over Human Rights and
Asian Values, II HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109, 145 (1998).
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 KUAN HSIN-CHI, supra note 2, at 58.
184 MBL, supra note 43, art. 8; Again, the Basic Law guarantees that the past legal structure will be
preserved, but only insofar that it is preserved in law. This is significantly different that the situation in
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judiciary in pre-handover Macau. This analysis is essential to determining if
there will be the same constitutional conflict in Macau as in Hong Kong.
The Organic Law' 85 passed by Portugal in 1976 served as a kind of
constitution and the basis of law leading up to the handover. 186 It created a
legislative assembly with six of its seventeen members directly elected, six
indirectly elected and five appointed. 87  Legislative acts, however, were
limited by the rights and privileges guaranteed by the Portuguese
Constitution, which was incorporated by reference into the Organic Law.
88
In addition, Portuguese law was incorporated into Macau's legal system,
including an independent judiciary and jury trials.' 89  Before 1991, Macau
was a "sub-judiciary district" of Portugal's judicial framework. 190 All cases
appealed from the Macau courts were heard in an appeals court in Lisbon.'
9'
Changes in 1999 made Macau's Supreme Court the court of final appeal
within the territory over all cases that did not implicate the Portuguese
Constitution. 192  Cases implicating the Constitution were appealed to
Portugal's Constitutional Court, which could overturn lower court
decisions.
193
Hong Kong, where one would look to the nebulous common law to discover the legal structure that is to be
preserved.
185 The Organic Statute of Macau, Law No. 1/76, (adopted Feb. 10, 1976, amended May 10, 1990)
[hereinafter Organic Law], available in SHIPP, supra note 8, at 178-93.
8 Id. at 94-95. GUNN, supra note 8, at 160.
187 GUNN, supra note 8, at 161. Chinese had to be residents for five years while Portuguese and
Macanese were exempted. Id. at 111.
188 The Organic Law, supra note 185, art. 2.
189 GuNN, supra note 8, at 161.
190 Sam Hou Fai, Brief Introduction of Judicial System of Macao, CHINA LAW (Supplement for
Macao's Return), Dec. 20, 1999 at 63.
191 Id.
92 Id. at 64.
193 Id. Appeals could be made to Portugal's Constitutional Court for the following decisions:
.. (i) Those rejecting the application of any provision on the grounds of unconstitutionality; (ii)
Those confirming the application of any provision, the constitutionality of which was questioned
before the court; (iii) Those rejecting the application of any provisions of a legislative act on the
grounds of violation of higher ranking law; (iv) Those giving application to a provision, the
legality of which was questioned before that court on the grounds of the preceding subparagraph;
v) Those applying a provision which has previously been deemed unconstitutional or illegal by
the Constitutional Court; (vi) Those applying a provision which has previously been deemed
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Committee, where the decision the Constitutional Court is
requested to consider is on the exactly same point of law; (vii) Those rejecting the application of
a provision contained in a legislative act, on the grounds that it contravenes an international
convention, or those which apply in a manner other than that which has previously been decided
by the Constitutional Court....
Third Periodic Reports of State Parties Due in 1991: Portugal Macau (Nov. 28, 1996), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/70/Add.9 [hereinafter U.N. Report], art. 2, pars. 3 (19(f)).
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A significant test of this system came in 1994. While Portugal's
Prime Minister visited China that year, the Supreme Court of Macau
reversed an earlier decision and extradited two ethnic Chinese to the
Mainland, where they were wanted for offenses punishable 
by death. 194
China had told the Court that it would remove the possibility of the death
penalty in sentencing. Critics pointed out two significant problems with the
Court's decision. First, no extradition treaty existed between China and
Portugal. 95  Second, Article 33 of the Portuguese Constitution clearly
forbids the extradition of persons to countries that practice the death
penalty. 96 The case was appealed to the Constitutional Court of Portugal
and the European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg.
97 In 1995, Portugal's
Constitutional Court overruled the Macau high court, upheld the defendants'
constitutional rights, and refused to extradite them.'
98 The Court said that
the Constitution's prohibition on extradition was absolute.
9 9 This decision
exemplifies Portugal's commitment to human rights in Macau. This
commitment exists, in part, because Portugal includes the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in its Constitutional protections and
adjudicates in accordance with its jurisprudence. 200 However, it is also clear
from the decision that Macau did not enjoy final Constitutional adjudication
while under Portuguese rule.
In view of the fact that Macau did not enjoy final adjudication, instead
enjoying judicial review under Portugal's constitutional system, an analysis
of this system is also necessary to determine whether there is potential
conflict between Macau and China. One scholar has said that Portugal's
judicial review is "the most complete system ... in Europe."
20° Established
in 1976 and amended in 1982, Portugal has a written Constitution that acts
as the supreme law of the land, under which all other state acts are
subordinated.20 2  Moreover, judicial review is expressly established in the
.. GUNN, supra note 8, at 181.
195 Ed Paisley, Human Rights for All? Portugal to Extradite Two Criminals to China, FAR E. ECON.
REv. 15 (1994)
196 GUNN, supra note 8, at 181.
197 Id.
198 Amnesty International, Macau: Human Rights Challenges for Transition (Dec. 15, 1999), Al
Index: ASA 27/03/99, available in <http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/ASA270031999?OpenDocument
&of=-COUNTRIESNACAO>.
19 Id.
200 See UN Report, supra note 193.
201 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 128, at 265.
202 Id. The Portuguese Constitution states: "The State shall be subject to this Constitution .. . The
validity of the laws and other actions of the State, the autonomous regions, local government and any other
public bodies depends upon their compliance with this Constitution." PORT. CONST. art. 3 §§ 2, 3,
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Constitution.2 °3  Portugal has what is known as a mixed system of
constitutional review possessing the two kinds of review typified by France
on the one hand and the United States on the other. That is, unconstitutional
laws may be challenged preventivelyE°or in a case or controversy.20 5 In the
case of preventive challenges, only the Constitutional Court206  has
jurisdiction. Otherwise, any court may refuse to apply a law to a case if it
finds it unconstitutional.
One advantage of "preventive control" of unconstitutional legislation
is that it allows for early clarification of constitutional issues.20 7 By contrast,
deciding constitutionality through cases and controversies alone will likely
leave the constitutional issue unresolved for a significant time. 208 Preventive
control also avoids the problems arising when a statute is enforced by the
courts over time and then is finally declared unconstitutional. 20 9 However,
preventive control can become difficult when the law is facially
constitutional but later becomes unconstitutional in how it is applied.21 In
those cases, having the back up of constitutional review through cases and
controversies is very important. One scholar has pointed out that under
Portugal's form of constitutional review, the legal security found in
preventive control is undermined when the Constitutional Court initially
available in <http://www.Dundee.ac.uk/politics/cphrc/documents/democratic/fundamental.htm> (last
visited Oct. 10, 2000).
203 PORT. CONST. art. 277 § I states: "Rules of law that contravene any provision of this Constitution
or the principles contained in it are unconstitutional."2
, Id. The Constitution provides:
The President of the Republic may request the Constitutional Court to undertake an anticipatory
review of the constitutionality of any provision of an international treaty that has been submitted
to the President for ratification, or of an instrument sent to the President for promulgation as a
law or a decree-law, or of an international agreement where the decree giving approval has been
presented for the signature of the President.
. . . Ministers for the Republic may also request the Constitutional Court to undertake an
anticipatory review of the constitutionality of any provision of a regional legislative decree or a
regulative decree for the implementation of the general law of the Republic that has been sent to
them for signature...
PORT. CONST. art. 278 §§ I, 2.
205 Id. Article 204 says that in "matters brought before them for decision, the courts shall not apply
any rules that contravene the provisions of this Constitution or the principles contained there."
206 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 125, at 266. The Court is comprised of 13 judges; 10 are elected by
the Assembly of the Republic and three are selected by the elected judges. Core document forming an
integral part of the reports of the States Parties: Portugal 19/04/93, § 61, U.N. Doc. HRI/CORE/l/Add.20
(1993).
207 HELMUT STEINBERGER, MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION 5 (1993).
208 Id.
209 Id.
2o Id. at 6.
JUDICIAL REVIEWIN MACAU
finds the legal norm constitutional but later finds it unconstitutional.
21 1
While potentially problematic from the standpoint of certainty, Portugal's
constitutional review scheme clearly offers the most opportunities to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute or other governmental act.
Constitutional review of this sort is at odds with Chinese policy.
4. Conclusion
Clearly, the fact that the Hong Kong courts had experienced
constitutional review of legislative acts influenced the Ng Ka Ling decision.
Whether Macau will continue the level of judicial review practiced before
the hand-over remains an open question. Arguably, the level of judicial
review practiced in a legal system is as much a function of legal culture as it
is black letter law. Certainly, the legal basis exists if the judiciary wants to
engage in aggressive constitutional review. However, since the Macau
judiciary is new and has little experience with constitutional review it is
unlikely that the courts will engage in the type of constitutional review
found in the Ng Ka Ling case.
D. Judicial Culture
Another factor leading to the conflict between Hong Kong and China
is the radically different style of judging they employ. One example is the
differing level of independence exercised by judges in China and Hong
Kong. This section compares the presidents of the Chinese and Hong Kong
high courts since the presidents of these high courts likely exercise the most
independence possible under their judicial systems.
1. Judicial Independence in Hong Kong and China
While judges in China are supposed to be independent under the
212Constitution, it is easy to see why many are skeptical of that promise. In
his annual report to the NPC, Xiao Yang, president of the Supreme People's
Court, made numerous references to implementing Communist Party policy
211 Id. at 7.
212 See PRC CONST., supra note 2, art. 126. "The people's courts exercise judicial power
independently, in accordance with the provisions of the law, and are not subject to interference by any
administrative organ, public organization or individual." Id.
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in the courts.213 According to Mr. Xiao's report, "[i]n 1999, under the
leadership of the party Central Committee with Comrade Jiang Zemin at the
core, the Supreme People's Court adhered to Deng Xiaoping Theory and the
party's basic line . .. Mr. Xiao told the NPC that the "people's courts
resolutely punished law offenders who tried to subvert the government of the
state and split the country," includinF cracking down on "heretical cult
organizations" such as the Falun Gong. 1
By contrast, Andrew Li Kwok-nang leads the Hong Kong Court of
Final Appeals. Mr. Li, a Cambridge-educated lawyer born in Hong Kong,
told reporters after his appointment, "I am deeply aware of the community's
expectations of the Judiciary. Our rights and freedom can only be
safeguarded by the fair and efficient administration of justice by an
,,216independent Judiciary. Mr. Li's comments are in line with the judicial
culture before the handover. Since the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance
was implemented in the five years before the handover, the judiciary was
"called upon . . . to exercise substantial constitutional judicial review
power. ,2 17 In doing so, the judiciary frequently referenced "overseas
common law and European Union precedent."' 18 This independence and use
of common law and international law is evident in the Ng Ka Ling decision.
2. Judicial Independence in Macau
Although Portugal has a strong history of constitutional review,
citizens of Macau have not had a chance to share in this history. Unlike
Hong Kong, ethnic Chinese have never been significant players in Macau's
legal system.219  This is because Portugal insisted on using only the
Portuguese language and appointing only Portuguese judges. 220  Since the
Basic Law now requires that the President of the Court of Appeals be a
Chinese citizen,221 the current President, Sam Hou Fai, had only two years
213 See China: Supreme People's Court Work Report to National People's Congress, BBC
ELECTRONIC MONITORING ASIA PAC., Mar. 30, 2000, available in LEXIS, Asia/Pacific Rim News, Current.
214 Id.
215 id.
216 Chris Yeung, Andrew Li Named as Top Judge, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 21, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 2263967. See also May Sin-Mi Hon & Patricia Young, Continuity in Choice of Top Appeal
Judges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2266190.
217 Davis, supra note 65, at 286.
218 id.
219 "[B]efore the handover, most judges and prosecutors were Portuguese expatriates who were often
completely ignorant of local names, customs and traditions, let alone the local language." Harald Bruning,
Language, Colonial Legacy Test Youthful Judiciary, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 22, 2000.
220 Id.
221 HKBL, supra note 38, art. 88.
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experience as a judge before his appointment.222 Some legal experts worry
that this inexperience would make the new top judges more prone to bow to
223pressure.  Thus, it is unclear whether the judges on Macau's Court of
Final Appeals will be as aggressive as the Hong Kong Court in protecting
their judicial review power and subsequently, the rights of its citizens. If the
judges do prove to be less aggressive, then it is unlikely that the conflicts
that occurred between Hong Kong and China would be relived in Macau.
3. Conclusion
By far the greatest concern should be that the courts function at all.
The Court of Final Appeal "has openly acknowledged the problem [of
imposing European jurisprudence on Chinese civil society], namely the
dearth of court clerks proficient in the two official languages, Portuguese
and Chinese., 224 Of the forty-two senior clerks at the Court, only four have
a "good command" of written Chinese.225 Another problem is that most of
the eighty-seven lawyers in Macau speak only Portuguese. 226 The new
system is plagued with "poorly-translated" evidentiary documents and
"seriously flawed" simultaneous interpretations of legal proceedings. 227
Whether the rule of law can survive while Macau's legal system matures is
far from clear.
V. CONCLUSION
If the factors that led to the conflict in Hong Kong are any predictor, it
is unlikely that a conflict will erupt between the Macau Court of Final
Appeal and the National People's Congress of the PRC. First, the Macau
Basic Law is less ambiguous than Hong Kong's Basic Law regarding final
adjudication. Second, unlike judges in Hong Kong, the Macau Court has
never been steeped in the legal tradition of a colonial power. Third, Macau's
judges do not have a history of exercising authority in the same way Hong
Kong's judges have done. In fact, most judges in Macau have only a few
years of legal experience. 22  Moreover, Macau's judges, unlike Hong
222 Alex Lo, Fears Raised Over Young Judge's Independence, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 10,
1999.
223 id.
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Kong's, probably have few expectations of what the legal system should
"look like." Because of this, they are less likely to guard their power in
quite the same way judges have in Hong Kong. Therefore, conflicts like Ng
Ka Ling are unlikely to occur in Macau.
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